This is a modified version of an essay I’ve been working on in my academic work. It ties in strongly, I think, with our previous posts on jobs, obligations, and contracts. It’s long for a blog post – but sometimes a full understanding requires a little elaboration. Eric had pointed out to me that blogs are meant to be read in a short stint – approximately how long one might be sitting on a toilet. It makes sense, but at the same time it’s kind of frightening to adjust the content of one’s message according to the average length of defecation. I think there is some sort of metaphor begging to be made here about the modern condition. In the meantime I’ll hope that our readers ate a large meal yesterday.
Does your life ever feel like an unending struggle to balance competing demands? There often seems little, if any, time for us to pause the activities that “have to get done” in order to reflect on the substance and purpose of those activities themselves. Political philosopher Hannah Arendt’s The Human Condition is an exercise in the classification and examination of our most fundamental human activities and may provide an insightful perspective to examine our lives. Written in a Cold War era of where man’s activities seemed to be leading toward self-destruction, Arendt proposes we stop and critically reflect on the significance and purpose of human activity so that we may “think what we are doing” before it is too late (p. 5). Arendt’s diagnosis of the modern human condition is not optimistic. She outlines in detail how we have become obsessed with the activities of production and consumption (which she names “labor”) and placed them as the centerpieces of our society. Arendt contrasts our society with that of the Ancient Greeks who consciously developed a public forum in which great deeds and speech (which she names “action”) could generate new ideas and influence the action of others. As a consequence of labor’s ascendancy in the public sphere, the higher order activity of action and its place in the public sphere, and the public sphere itself, has diminished. The task then for Arendt, and for individuals seeking to meaningfully engage in the world, is to reconstitute public spaces is by developing specific “faculties” such as forgiveness and promise making (p. 237). This essay will briefly examine Arendt’s categorization of human activities, the necessary faculties for engaging in action, and the potential place of action in our own lives.
For Arendt, humankind is defined by its most common activities. She categorizes human activities into a hierarchy of three groups and labels humans according to activities in which they engage. Animal laborans is the label she gives to the most basic and essential human activities: labor and consumption. Arendt calls laboring and consuming activities “metabolic” not only because of their close relation to the life process, but also because laboring and consuming, like the functions of the body, require little thought (pp. 98-100). The second label Arendt gives is homo faber which means man who “works upon” or who “makes something” (p.136). Homo faber is defined by the activity of “work”. Work is the act of creating and constructing material objects of a lasting durability (p. 143). According to Arendt, it is work that allows humans to build a world that extends across generations and improve the conditions under which we labor and consume.
Arendt carefully delineates how over the course of human history, labor, defined as the repetitive and painful activities required to sustain one’s life, has been regulated to the domestic realm. It is only since the advent of the industrial revolution when the activities of homo faber (i.e., the activities of production) were broken into small unskilled movements that the activity of labor became central to economic and social life (pp. 123-124). If the system of production requires any indistinguishable person to constitute its basic movements, humans become defined by their ‘labor power’ and not by their skills or actions, and each man/woman labors so that he/she might “earn a living” (pp. 125-128). In this system homo faber plays a secondary role of engineering machines or developing organizational processes that can increase the total production. Of significance to Arendt is that the purpose of the machine or organization is not primarily to build something of lasting significance or value to humanity, but instead to increase consumption which by definition cannot have lasting significance or value (pp. 145-149). Labor saving technologies and increasingly complex organizational structures present a great irony:
The rather uncomfortable truth of the matter is that the triumph the modern world has achieved over necessity is due to the emancipation of labor, this is, to the fact the animal laborans was permitted to occupy the public realm; and yet, as long as animal laborans remains in possession of it, there can be no true public realm, but only private activities displayed in the open. The outcome is what is euphemistically called mass culture, and its deep-rooted trouble is a universal unhappiness (pp. 133-134).
Arendt identifies clearly the negative consequences of laboring for its own sake: the potential destruction of the natural world and an existential unhappiness for those caught in the never-ending labor/consumption cycle. Arendt notes that industrialization did have profound and remarkable positive contributions in improving the physical quality of life across the global. But as a consequence of labor and consumption’s ascendancy in the public sphere, the activity Arendt labels as the greatest form of human activity, “action”, has been subsumed and its place in the public sphere, and the public sphere itself, have diminished.
It is the third activity of “action” that is Arendt’s highest classification of human endeavor and representative of the title zoon politikon. Arendt says that humans are imbued with the unique freedom to “set into motion”, through deeds and speech, actions that have never been taken before and whose influence is impossible to predict (p. 189). Essential to action is the presence of others –a public sphere. Arendt states that action “corresponds with the human condition of plurality” and action itself is what constitutes “the condition…of all political life” (p. 7). Action is not drawn from the necessity of animal laborans or the desire for mastery of homo faber, which each seem to follow observable patterns of ‘standard’ human behavior. Arendt says that genuine action possesses a “miraculous” quality because it is immersed in the diversity of interests and values of human life and brings into being new thoughts and relationships amongst the public which had never before existed (p. 178). As such action is very much an “event”, not a process or idea, which takes place at a particular time and place when a human attempts to influence others (p. 259).
Stepping outside the cycle of labor and work to engage in the activity of action can be a risky, even dangerous, endeavor. Because we cannot know how others will interpret or react, actions can set off a chain of unintended consequences, potentially putting ourselves or others at risk of scorn or worse. But to refrain from action would inhibit our ability to improve the world. Arendt offers a way out of the dilemma posed by action: learning how to forgive. Arendt describes forgiveness as a faculty because it requires the development of an understanding that no human can ever fully comprehend what he or she is doing and a sense of empathy for our mutual lack of control. She writes,
…trespassing is an everyday occurrence which is in the very nature of action’s constant establishment of new relationships within a web of relations, and it needs forgiving, dismissing, and order to make it possible for life to go on by constantly releasing men from what they have done unknowingly. Only through this constant mutual release from what they do can men remain free agents, only by constant willingness to change their minds and start again can they be trusted with so great a power as that to begin something new.” (p. 240)
The faculty of forgiveness seems out of place in era of “accountability”, but it is essential in a learning community centered around action so that acting bravely and boldly (with good intentions) can be encouraged and supported.
Another faculty required of a community that supports action is the ability to make and keep promises. Promise making is distinguished from the fulfillment of obligations or commitments tied to the processes of work – it is the development of trust among peers. Again related to the fear that action’s course is unpredictable, a promise between individuals represents the support needed to carry through the deed. Arendt calls promises “isolated islands of certainty in an ocean of uncertainty” but when they are not explicitly tied to a specific action and attempt to apply generally to all circumstances “they lose their binding power and the whole enterprise becomes self-defeating” (p. 244). Without the capacities to forgive and to make promises, humans would never be able to overcome the fear of irreversibility and unpredictability and would avoid action (p. 237). But if these faculties have a strong place in a community it develops trust and encourages new and bold deeds.
In summary of Arendt’s The Human Condition, it appears that while labor sustains life, and work can improve the material conditions of life, it is action that provides humanity it’s fullest meaning and purpose. In order to be encouraged, action requires an active community that not only bears witness to the deeds, but has the capacity to keep promises and forgive well-intentioned misdeeds. Does this conception of human endeavors resonate with you? Do communities or forums exist in the public realm that have the characteristics necessary for meaningful action? Is this blog such a place? (click the “follow” link in the bottom right if you think so)